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Abstract 
We study the impact of conflict on both the extensive and the intensive margin of child labor 
in Afghanistan. We identify and test two main mechanisms. First, if conflict reduces a 
household income through a decline in parent's compensations, child labor may insure against 
the decrease in consumption (extensive margin). Second, a child may work longer hours if the 
marginal benefits of working under conflict is greater than its marginal cost, which may 
depend on the relative compensations between adults and children, and on the alternative 
activities (e.g. schooling). Using detailed conflict data from the Afghan War Diary we identify 
the effect of conflict relying on a shift-share IV strategy.  We find that conflict increases the 
probability that girls work, but reduces the number of hours worked. Our results suggest that 
this is due to a decrease in household income and an increase in the relative compensations 
of adults. 
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1 Introduction
The economic and social consequences of conﬂicts are dramatic for children, both in
youth and later on in adulthood. One immediate consequence is child labor. Does
conﬂict push more children to work, and/or to work more hours? While the economic
literature on child labor and on conﬂict are rich, they rarely speak to each-other.
Relatively little is known about whether and how conﬂict inﬂuences the incidence
of child labor. The few studies analyzing the micro-economic eﬀects of conﬂicts on
children focus on schooling and on the extensive margin of child labor supply (Di Maio
and Nandi, 2013; Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2012). And there are no studies that analyze
the impact of conﬂict on the intensive margin (the number of hours worked).
In this paper we provide new evidence on whether the recent conﬂict in Afghanistan
had an impact on the number of children working (extensive margin), and on the
number of hours they worked once they are in the labor market (intensive margin).
Extending the work by Basu and Van (1998) to a conﬂict setting we identify and test
two main mechanisms.
First, if conﬂict reduces a household income through a decline in the compensation
of adults, parents may employ child labor to insure against the decrease in consump-
tion. Second, in deciding how many hours a child should work, parents may evaluate
if the marginal beneﬁts of child labor under conﬂict is greater than its marginal cost.
This will depend on whether the relative compensations of adults and children are
aﬀected by conﬂict, and on the alternative activities that children may attend. An in-
crease in the relative wage of children with respect to parents may increase the number
of hours they work (replacing adult's work). Similarly, reduced availability of schooling
(for security reason, or for destruction of infrastructures) may increase the marginal
beneﬁts of children work (for the household) than of investing in their education.
The recent conﬂict (2001-09) in Afghanistan varies substantially in its intensity
across districts, and so does child labor. Afghanistan is also one of the countries with
the highest incidence of child labor. Considering as working all children that declared
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to have done some work in the previous week, the survey data used in this study
suggest that 18.5% of Afghan children were working in 2007-08. This percentage is
well above the average child labor rate in low-income countries for children between
5-17, which was 10.6% in 2012 (ILO, 2013). Even though Afghanistan has made some
legislative commitments in the past two decades1, child labor still accounts for one of
the largest problems in the country. Given that Afghanistan still experience severe
conﬂict events and high level of insecurity, conﬂict induced child labor may represent
a major impediment to Afghan development (Akresh and De Walque, 2008).
We study the eﬀect of conﬂict on the extensive and intensive margins of child labor
exploiting the variation of conﬂict intensity across districts, a rich household survey
that investigates children participation in the labor market, extremely precise and
reliable information on conﬂict events, and a robust shift-share instrumental variable
(IV) strategy. We ﬁnd that conﬂict signiﬁcantly increases the probability that a girl
works by about 7 percentage points, but no signiﬁcant eﬀect on boys. We also ﬁnd
that conﬂict signiﬁcantly decrease girls' average non-domestic hours worked per day of
about half an hour, and again no signiﬁcant results on boys. We also ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on domestic hours worked.
Overall, the ﬁndings suggest that necessity is the main driver of the increase in
children labor supply. As predicted by the framework used in this paper, more girls
are sent to work as the compensation of work reduces, having a negative impact on
households' expenditures. However, as the compensation of children fall more than
proportionally with respect to adults, children work fewer hours. We ﬁnd that the
opportunity cost related to access to schooling does not play a signiﬁcant role in our
results.
1In 2013, Afghanistan made a moderate advancement in eﬀorts to eliminate the worst forms of
child labor. The Government of Afghanistan announced the adoption of a list of 29 jobs/working
conditions prohibited for children.
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Relevant Literature
Sending children to work is often a necessity to guarantee a household's survival (Basu
and Van, 1998).2 In the literature on child labor only a few studies estimate the impact
of conﬂict on child labor, and all focus on the extensive margin: they all ﬁnd that
conﬂict increases the number of children working.
Di Maio and Nandi (2013) identify the impact of conﬂict on child labor and school
attendance in the West Bank exploiting the exogenous number of days of closure
between Israel and the Palestinian Territory. They ﬁnd that for each day of closure,
child labor increases and school attendance (weakly) decreases in the West Bank.
Rodriguez and Sanchez (2012), instrument for conﬂict in Colombia using the lagged
antinarcotics operations at the municipality level and the homicide captures at the
state level interacted with municipal population. They ﬁnd that conﬂict increases
child labor by inducing them to drop out of school and enter the labor market. These
studies suggest that conﬂict may increase as well the number of hours worked, but this
eﬀect has not been tested yet in the economic literature.
One main channel through which conﬂict may push households income below sub-
sistence is a reduction in compensations. Di Maio and Nandi (2013) and Calì and
Miaari (2013) ﬁnd that barriers to mobility associated with the Palestinian conﬂict
reduced wages. Iyer and Santos (2012) show that across several South Asia countries,
conﬂict areas experience an increase in unpaid (family) jobs. Bove and Gavrilova
(2014) ﬁnd that military deployment in Afghanistan increase both wages and prices.
Kondylis (2010) ﬁnds that in Bosnia displaced men were more likely to be unemployed
and displaced women were more likely to drop out from the labor force.
However, in a country such as Afghanistan, predominantly rural, the majority of
employment is self-employment, subsistence agriculture, or family employment. Paid
labor represents a small fractions of household's compensation. It is therefore more
2According to the Luxury Axiom: A family will send the children to the labor market only if the
family's income from non-child-labor sources drops very low (Basu and Van, 1998, p. 416). The
child labor phenomena has been widely analyzed both theoretically and empirically in the recent
literature. Theoretically, a key reference point in the literature is Basu and Van (1998) and the most
recent literature on the topic is summarized in Edmonds (2007) and Bar and Basu (2009).
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relevant to investigate how conﬂict aﬀects self-employment and through this the com-
pensation. A small number of papers have studied households allocation of labor
in conﬂict. They all ﬁnd that conﬂict pushes households from activities with higher
returns to investment to activities with lower returns (see for example Bundervoet
(2010); Ciarli et al. (2015); Deininger (2003)).
Increased work may also be the result of reduced schooling options. Most studies
look at how conﬂict aﬀects school enrollment and attainment, suggesting a negative
eﬀect on primary education, although results may diﬀer on the extent and the duration
of these eﬀects. Some studies ﬁnd that conﬂict has a short term impact on primary
school enrollment (e.g. Chen et al., 2008). Others ﬁnd long-term negative eﬀects
of violent conﬂict on school enrollment, school attainment and and an increase in
school drop-out (e.g. Akresh and De Walque (2008) for Rwanda, Chamarbagwala and
Morán (2011) for Guatemala, Leon (2012) for Peru, Shemyakina (2011) for Tajikistan,
Swee et al. (2009) for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rodriguez and Sanchez (2012) for
Colombia).
The paper contributes in several ways to the extant literature. We extend the
basic child labor framework to understand main mechanisms that operate in a conﬂict
setting. We improve the identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of conﬂict by exploiting reliable and
precise information on conﬂict location. We look at direct, local area speciﬁc conﬂict
eﬀects rather than the indirect conﬂict eﬀects examined by Di Maio and Nandi (2013).
We provide preliminary evidence on the how conﬂict aﬀect the number of hours worked.
And we extend the mechanisms that may induce change in child labor beyond the
schooling versus working decisions (Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2012), exploring changes
in expenditure and relative changes in compensation between adults and children.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates and discusses the theoretical
framework (details are found in the Appendix). Section 3 describes how we address
the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the main results, the estimation of the
mechanisms and the robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
4
2 Theoretical Framework
To illustrate the relation between conﬂict and child labor we employ the basic model
by Basu and Van (1998). We make a number of assumptions to keep the illustration
straightforward. First, as standard in the literature (Basu and Van, 1998) we assume
that parents prefer that their children do not work, unless there is not enough income
to sustain the household. Second, we assume that all occupations can be held by
adults and children, although the productivity and therefore the compensation may
be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (higher for adults). In the context of Afghanistan, where
most households rely on non-sophisticated self-employment activities, particularly in
agriculture (e.g. Ciarli et al., 2015; Lind et al., 2014; Iyer and Santos, 2012), the
assumption is plausible for many occupations. Third, the decision of whether a child
works is taken by the household (parents). Fourth, we assume that the decisions about
a child working or not, and for how many hours, are taken in separate moments. We
will discuss both decision in turn, with respect to adults' and children's compensations.
Following Basu and Van (1998), we deﬁne c ≥ 0 parents' consumption, M ≥ 1 the
total number of children in a household, em ∈ {0, 1} a children'sm ∈ [1,M ] work eﬀort,
wa > 0 and wc ≥ 0 respectively the parents' and children's compensation for work,
and 0 < b < 1 children's equivalent scale of consumption. For simplicity wa represents
the compensation for both parent's work, and each child earns wc. A household's
income is than the sum of all compensations, depending on how many children work:
wa+
∑M
1 emwc. The budget constrain is the sum of adults' and children's consumption:
c+Mbc.
Given the ﬁrst altruistic assumption, the following general ordering of preferences
is valid:
(c, 0)  (c+ δ, 1)  (c+ 2δ, 2)  . . .  (c+Mδ,M) (1)
where δ is the increased level of consumption granted by a child's compensation. A
households always prefers that fewer children work. Introducing the budget constraint,
a household will send the ﬁrst child to work only if the parents' compensation is not
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enough for the survival of the whole household. Similarly, a household will send the Mth
child to work only if the parents' compensation and theM −1 children compensations
are not suﬃcient for the household's survival:
(c, 0)  (c+ δ, 1) if wa ≥ c+Mbc
(c+Mδ,M)  (c+ (M − 1)δ, (M − 1)) if wa + (M − 1)wc ≤ c+Mbc
(2)
As a result, the number of children that work increase as parents' compensation de-
creases.
To see this graphically, we use the generalised eﬀort function derived by Basu
and Van (1998) as an outcome of households maximising their utility with respect to
consumption and leisure (u (c, 1− e)) subject to the above budget constraint:
e (wa, wc) =

0 if s+ sMb+Mwc ≤ wa
1 if s+ sMb−Mwc ≥ wa
Mwc−wa+s+sMb
2Mwc
otherwise
(3)
where s > 0 is the subsistence level.
We use this simple model to discuss how changes in household's income and relative
wages may inﬂuence the decision to send children to work, and how much they work.
A graphical explanation of the model behavior is provided in Appendix B.
To summarise, if an increase in conﬂict reduces wa and wc, reducing household
income, the number of children working is expected to increase (extensive margin).
On the intensive margin, if wc reduces more than proportionally with respect to wa,
children exert lower eﬀort (work for a fewer number of hours), as the opportunity cost
of reducing leisure is not compensated by the increase in household income. Whether
conﬂict in Afghanistan has a larger eﬀect on wa or on wc depends on the changes in
the household's income generating activities, which is an empirical question.
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3 Empirical Strategy
Following Manacorda (2006) empirical strategy we test the child labor extensive margin
controlling for unobservable wa and wc with characteristics of the individual and of the
environment. For the individual, as in Manacorda (2006) we use children age; for the
environment we use our main variable of interest, conﬂict intensity, which we expect
to reduce both wa and wc. Following the theoretical framework, we also control for M
and b with the household size and average age.
First, we estimate the eﬀect of our main variable of interest, conﬂict, on the exten-
sive and intensive margin.
Second, we test for the two main mechanisms explaining the extensive and intensive
margins. Does conﬂict reduce wa and wc to the extent that a reduction in s induces
parents to send one or more children to work? In our framework s depends on com-
pensations, and will be proxied by household expenditures. Does conﬂict change the
relative compensation, such that a decrease in wa/wc increases the number of hours
worked by children? To answer to this question we test the eﬀect of conﬂict on the
share of household and children working in a household. Under the assumptions that
if more adults work with respect to children, is because the adult's compensation is
relatively higher.
Third, we also test for an alternative hypothesis that can be indirectly derived
from the model: does a decrease in leisure opportunities increases the probability that
child works? We test this hypothesis exploiting information on children enrollment in
school.
3.1 Estimated Equation
To test for children eﬀort we deﬁne the following estimation equation
eihd = α1 + α2Confd + α3Xi + α4Xh + α5Xd + uihd (4)
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where eihd is the eﬀort of child i in household h in district d; Confd is the number of
conﬂict events per district (normalised by population); Xi are children characteristics,
sex and age, which proxy for wage diﬀerences with respect to adults; Xh are household
characteristics, Xd are the district characteristics.
Following the theoretical framework, we estimate two versions of Equation 4, dis-
tinguishing between the decision of whether to send a child to work or not (e = [0; 6= 0])
 extensive margin, and the amount of eﬀort in case the child works e ∈ (0, 1]  inten-
sive margin. To estimate the ﬁrst version we use a Linear Probability Model (LPM).
To test for the second version we employ an OLS. In Equation 4 the outcome of eihd is
either 0 or 1 for the LPM and a natural number in the case of the OLS.3 We estimate
the equation clustering standard errors at the district level in order to control for the
group correlation of the error term within the districts.
The household control variables chosen are those that are supposed to have an
impact on child labor according to the model and the literature (Manacorda, 2006).
A full list and description is available in Appendix A.1 in Table 10. Household size
captures M , a proxy for consumption; information on gender, literacy and age of the
household head and for the household's average, as these characteristics may inﬂuence
income and a household's decisions to send children to work; shocks experienced in the
previous year, other than conﬂict, which may also aﬀect income; and income proxies,
such as number of assets, electricity, and remittances.
We also control for district level covariates which may inﬂuence children partici-
pation to labor and conﬂict: the geographical variations in altitude which could aﬀect
agricultural activities, share of rural communities, and average number of households
whose ﬁrst source of income is opium cultivation, average population age and share of
male adults.
Finally, as most of the children work in agricultural activities, we add months ﬁxed
eﬀects to control for potential seasonality bias. We do not include district or province
3We also estimate a Tobit model to account for both the extensive and intensive margin in Section
4.3.
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ﬁxed eﬀects as they soak up most of the conﬂict variation.
3.2 Identiﬁcation Strategy
Equation 4 may fail to correctly identify the eﬀect of conﬂict on the probability that a
child works and on the number of hours worked. First, we cannot control for diﬀerences
between areas such as average wealth and ethnicity. It is possible that poorer areas
are both more aﬀected by conﬂict and have higher number of children working, and
that some ethnic groups are more likely to experience conﬂict and a higher incidence
of child labor. Second, despite the high quality and precision of our conﬂict data, some
measurement error may persist.
We address endogeneity with a shift-share instrumental variable strategy common
in labor and migration studies (Bartel, 1989; Altonji and Card, 1991; Saiz, 2003,
e.g.) and already implemented in Ciarli et al. (2015) with regards to conﬂict. We
instrument conﬂict in time t and district d multiplying the share of conﬂicts in district
d in a previous conﬂict with the nation-level conﬂict intensity in time t. We use the
Soviet war between 1979-1989 to compute the share of conﬂict in district d, assuming
that past conﬂict intensity is unrelated to child labor today.4
The reference to the Soviet conﬂict (1979-1989) to instrument for the eﬀect of the
recent conﬂict on child labor may raise questions on the exclusion restriction. For
instance, omitted geographical and ethnic factors may have inﬂuenced both the Soviet
conﬂict in 1979-89 and child labor in 2007-2008. To control for these we include the
average altitude of the communities in the district. As a robustness check, we also
include the distance of the household from Pakistan, which is a good proxy for terrain
ruggedness, altitude and ethnic groups.
Second, conﬂict in 1979-89 could aﬀect child labor thirty years after through its im-
pact on the parents' schooling or death. Although Afghanistan has one of the youngest
4We report in Panel A of all estimation tables the F-test, which is safely above the rule of thumb
of 10. This suggests that the instrument is relevant and past conﬂict intensity in a sector might be
correlated with the current intensity because of exogenous geographical factors (such as accessibility,
position, etc.).
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population in the world We address impact on parent's education by controlling for
the household head's literacy. As a robustness check we also control for the presence
of the father and of the mother in the household.
Third, the Soviet conﬂict might have changed the geographical distribution of
child-labor-intensive economic sectors across districts. Although conﬂict does inﬂuence
households' activities in the short run, in 20 years the Afghan economy has changed
more profoundly. Opium production has increased more than ﬁve times between 1990
and 2007 (more than 40 times between 1980 and 2007) (Lind et al., 2014); and the
level and composition of exports has changed dramatically between 1994 and 2007
(Hausmann et al., 2014);5; and informal cross-border trade routes also have intensi-
ﬁed substantially since the end of the 90's (Ghiasy et al., 2015). Such changes are so
substantial that they are unlikely to be inﬂuenced by household's labor allocation. Fi-
nally, within agriculture, changes in access to arable land, irrigation, and productivity
in Afghanistan have been aﬀected mainly by climate changes in the last two decades
(Aich et al., 2017), including one of the most sever drought between 1998-2006. Such
changes are likely to wipe away the eﬀects of past conﬂict (occurred 20 years earlier)
on economic sectors in 2007-2008.
3.3 Data
We construct a unique dataset which combines household information on child labor
from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007 - 2008 survey, con-
ﬂict data from the Afghan War Diaries (AWD) and from the Global Data on Events,
Location and Tone (GDELT). All datasets are geo-coded and were matched by district
using GIS software.
NRVA 2007 - 2008 (, dataset1): the survey covers 20,576 rural and urban house-
holds (152,262 individuals) in all Afghan 34 provinces, 395 districts (2,572 clusters/villages).
The draft questionnaires were tested twice in the ﬁeld and a pilot test of the ques-
5Partly due to the cease of the production of natural gas after the Russian occupation (Ghiasy et
al., 2015).
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tionnaires took place in ﬁve regions for further and ﬁnal improvements. The ﬁeldwork
started in mid-August 2007 and lasted up to the end of August 2008. The sample frame
is based on the updated CSO pre-census household listing. The sample is proportional
to population, with over-sampling of smaller provinces and large cities.
The analysis focuses on children between 6-15 years old. The data include infor-
mation on whether the child is working (extensive margin) and on how many hours
she works (intensive margin). A child is deﬁned to be in work if economically active
i.e. if she has worked for at least one hour (remunerated or not) in the week before
the interview. We also exploit information on the sector, and we distinguish between
domestic and non-domestic hours worked. A part from child labor, we used NRVA to
construct information on individuals, households and district controls.
AWD (, dataset2): a large dataset of all military activities recorded (and not
cleared by intelligence, i.e. unbiased) during the Afghan war between 2004-2009 by
US troops. The data was reported by soldiers and intelligence oﬃcers, and includes in-
telligence information, reports of meetings with political partners, and related details.
Each report contains a large amount of the event's details, including the geographical
coordinates, the number of individuals killed and wounded, and a description of the
actions. These details were machine coded in a set of variables immediately after they
were leaked. A number of studies have veriﬁed the reliability and the accuracy of these
data (Zammit-Mangion et al., 2012, e.g.).
We deﬁne `relevant' conﬂict events those events which can be observed by the pop-
ulation and may cause disruption of economic activity, or fear, or any other condition
that could aﬀect households' behaviour, and exclude other events such as unexploded
bombs or medical interventions (see Table 11 in the Appendix).6 Finally, each conﬂict
event was assigned to a district. Conﬂict is measured as the number of conﬂict events
in a district by population (in thousands).
GDELT (, dataset3): the dataset contains geo-referenced conﬂict events reported
by media since 1979, broken into four categories: verbal cooperation (e.g. military
6See (O'Loughlin et al., 2010) for a similar classiﬁcation.
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agreements), material cooperation (actions of allied troops), verbal conﬂict (e.g. dec-
larations of a state of war), and material conﬂict (e.g. exploded bombs).
We sum all material conﬂict events, per district, between 1979-1989 to compute
the relative intensity of a district during the Soviet conﬂict.
The variables used for the analysis are described in Table 10 in the Appendix.
3.4 Data description
Table 1 presents the average percentage of children 6-15 working in a household, dis-
tinguishing by gender.
Table 1: Percentage of children working
Total Males Females
Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict
18.5 23.6 19.6 12.0 14.8 12.2 6.4 8.7 7.4
In 2007-2008, about 18.5% of children between 6 and 15 years old were working
to some extent in some activity. This share is higher, about 23.6%, when considering
high conﬂict intensity areas.7 There are also important gender diﬀerences: the share
of boys working is almost the double than the share of females. When compared with
the world average in 2012 (10.6%, for children aged 5-17) (ILO, 2013) in Afghanistan
there is a higher than average incidence of child labor.
Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the number of hours worked8 by an average child in
the past week, respectively in total, non-domestic activities, and domestic activities.
Children worked on average 4 hours per day in non-domestic activities and 1.5 hours
per day in domestic ones, with small diﬀerence across gender in the total number of
hours: males work slightly more in non-domestic and females slightly more in domestic
activities. For all activities the number of hours worked slightly decreases in higher
conﬂict intensity areas compared to lower intensity ones.
7We deﬁne high conﬂict intensity areas those in the top quartile of the conﬂict distribution; low
conﬂict intensity areas those in the lowest quartile.
8Deﬁnition in Table 10
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Table 2: N. of average total hours worked per day in the past week by sex
and conﬂict intensity
Total Males Females
Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict
5.5 5.3 5.9 5.4 5.1 5.8 5.6 5.7 6.0
Table 3: N. of average non-domestic hours worked per day in the past week
by sex and conﬂict intensity
Total Males Females
Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict
4.0 3.9 4.1 5.1 4.1 3.9 3.7 3.9 3.9
Table 4: N. of average domestic hours worked per day in the past week by
sex and conﬂict intensity
Total Males Females
Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict
1.5 1.5 1.8 1.2 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.8 2.2
Figure 3a and 3b in Appendix D show the distribution of both domestic and non-
domestic hours worked in high and low conﬂict areas.
We next look at how child labor is distributed among diﬀerent activities, distin-
guishing by gender (Table 5). The relative majority of children work in agriculture
(41%), which is the most populated group of activities for males (51%), but not so for
females (21%). The second most frequent group of activities is within the household
(39%), and disproportionately so for females (71%). The other important activities
are in shops (5%), on the street (5%), and in an employer's house (1%), all male
dominated.
Table 6 shows the summary statistics for all variables for the sample used in the
analysis. The children in the sample are on average about 10 years old and the sample
is gender balanced. Almost all the households have a male household head who on
average is about 45 years old and not literate (68%). Most of the households live in
rural communities (77%) and have an equal share of male and female adults. Districts
are composed mainly by rural communities (80%) and, on average, about 4.5% of the
households in the district declare to cultivate opium as a main household activity.
The average age of household members in each district is about 20.3 years old and the
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Table 5: Percentage of children working by type of activity
Type of activity Total Males Females
At the household dwelling 39.2 22.3 70.8
Employer's house 1.1 1.3 0.7
Formal Oﬃce 0.0 0.0 0.0
Factory 0.2 0.3 0.0
Plantations/farm/garden 40.6 51.1 21.0
Construction site 0.7 1.0 0.1
Quarrying sites 0.0 0.1 0.0
Shop/Market/ Kiosk/ Restaurant 4.9 7.3 0.5
On the street (selling or carrying things) 1.1 1.7 0.1
On the street (collecting things for household) 3.9 4.3 3.1
Other (specify) 8.0 10.3 3.5
Total 100.00 100.0 100.0
share of literate household members is about 24%. In 2007/8 on average an Afghan
district experienced 0.43 conﬂicts every 1000 inhabitants.
Table 6: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dependent variables
Working child (Dummy) 0.185 0.388 0 1 48176
N. of non-domestic hours worked 0.743 1.832 0 12 48148
N. of domestic hours worked 0.278 0.916 0 12 47929
Works in the HH dwellings (Dummy) 0.073 0.259 0 1 48176
Works in agriculture (Dummy) 0.075 0.264 0 1 48176
Works in an hazardous activity (Dummy) 0.002 0.042 0 1 48176
Works in a shop (Dummy) 0.009 0.095 0 1 48176
Works in another activity (Dummy) 0.024 0.153 0 1 48176
School enrollment (Dummy) 0.474 0.499 0 1 48176
Non-food expenditure (per capita) 2530.795 5444.446 5.5 222100.797 48167
Food expenditure (per capita) 183.148 120.041 0.143 2284.798 48176
Total HH expenditure (per capita) 2713.948 5462.481 18.4 222501.469 48167
Regular employee paid to parents in kind
(Dummy)
0.002 0.042 0 1 48176
Continued on next page
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Table 6  continued from previous page
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Regular employee paid to parents in money
(Dummy)
0.004 0.062 0 1 48176
Regular employee paid to the child in kind
(Dummy)
0.001 0.029 0 1 48176
Regular employee paid to the child in money
(Dummy)
0.003 0.059 0 1 48176
Casual employee paid to parents (Dummy) 0.002 0.046 0 1 48176
Casual employee paid to child (Dummy) 0.003 0.052 0 1 48176
Has his business (Dummy) 0.002 0.048 0 1 48176
Unpaid family worker in the HH (Dummy) 0.015 0.12 0 1 48176
Works in agric./livestock (Dummy) 0.142 0.349 0 1 48176
Works in another activity (Dummy) 0.011 0.104 0 1 48176
Children characteristics
Sex 0.52 0.5 0 1 48173
Age 10.156 2.882 6 15 48176
Household characteristics
Household size 9.068 3.491 2 34 48176
Male household head (Dummy) 0.984 0.124 0 1 48176
Age household head 44.877 12.275 9 99 48176
Average age in the household 19.295 4.826 7.4 57.667 48176
% of males in the household 0.511 0.14 0 1 48176
%of male children in the household 0.52 0.289 0 1 48176
% of male adults in the household 0.503 0.137 0 1 48176
Literacy of the household head (Dummy) 0.323 0.468 0 1 48176
Rural community (Dummy) 0.772 0.419 0 1 45275
N. of household assets 2.986 2.283 0 7 48176
Migration of a household member (Dummy) 0.072 0.259 0 1 48035
Shocks (Dummy) 0.49 0.5 0 1 48176
Distance to Pakistan 1.824 1.536 0 5.587 48176
Continued on next page
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Table 6  continued from previous page
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
District characteristics
Average altitude of the district 1360.717 687.468 257.789 4763.95 47212
%of rural communities in the district 0.784 0.361 0 1 48176
% of HH with opium cultivation as main in-
come source
0.045 0.161 0 1 48176
Average age in the district 20.325 1.589 14.22 26.149 48176
% of males in the district 0.512 0.026 0.383 0.641 48176
% of literate people in the district 0.243 0.134 0 0.679 48176
Conﬂict measures
N. of conﬂicts 0.433 1.003 0 8.679 48176
IV 0.212 1.485 0 39.664 48176
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 The impact of conﬂict on the extensive margin of child
labor supply
We study the impact of higher conﬂict intensity in Afghan districts on children (6-
15 years old) participation in the labor force (the extensive margin of child labor
supply). We estimate a version of equation 4 in which the eﬀort is a binary variable
(e = [0; 6= 0]), using both a LPM and an IV strategy. Table 7, panel A, reports the ﬁrst
stage of the IV regression, suggesting that there is a positive signiﬁcant relationship
between the Soviet conﬂict between 1979-1989 and the conﬂict in 2007-2008 at the
district level. The F-test (larger than 10) also suggests that the instrument is valid.
Table 7, panel B, reports the marginal eﬀect of conﬂict intensity on the probability
that a child works (OLS, odd columns), and the estimated coeﬃcient for the conﬂict
intensity instrument (IV, even columns) for all children (cols. 1-2) and by gender (cols.
16
3-6). All OLS results suggest a negative relation between conﬂict and the probability
that a child works. However, IV results suggest that these coeﬃcients are downward
biased. This is possibly because wage labor signiﬁcantly decreases in conﬂict areas
(Ciarli et al., 2015; Iyer and Santos, 2012). The IV coeﬃcients suggest that conﬂict
does not signiﬁcantly increase the probability that a boy works but one more conﬂict
per thousand inhabitants increases the probability of a girl working of about seven
percentage points (signiﬁcantly at the 5% level).
Concluding, the results seem to suggest that only girls increase their labor force
participation in Afghan districts with higher conﬂict.
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4.2 The impact of conﬂict on the intensive margin of child
labor supply
If a child works, how many hours does she devote to it? As suggested in Figure 2 in
the theoretical framework, the answer depends on how conﬂict changes the adult/child
wage ratio. Here we estimate a version of Equation 4 in which the eﬀort is a continuous
(e ∈ (0, 1]) where nearly no eﬀort is nearly zero hours of work and maximum eﬀort
would be equivalent to eight hours of work. As we distinguish the eﬀect of conﬂict by
gender, we ran separate regressions for domestic and non-domestic activities.
Table 8 shows OLS and IV estimates of conﬂict (per 1000 inhabitants) on the
number of daily non-domestic hours worked, for children that work. We focus on IV
results, as they are more reliable. The IV regressions suggest that all children work
less in non-domestic activities, however, the eﬀect is signiﬁcant (at 10%) only for girls
(column 6): on average they work 0.33 non-domestic hours less per day when the
district in which they live experiences one more conﬂict event (per 1000 inhabitants).
Instead, the eﬀect of conﬂict on the number of hours that children devote to do-
mestic activities is positive, but not signiﬁcant, even when disaggregating by gender
(Table 9).
To summarize, we ﬁnd evidence that an increase in conﬂict intensity increases the
likelihood that a girl works, but for those who work, the number of hours dedicated
to non-domestic activities decreases: more girls work less hours. In the next section
we investigate three potential mechanisms that might explain these results.
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4.2.1 Potential Mechanisms
The framework that we employ in this paper suggests that children are more likely
to work if the parent's compensations falls below subsistence level, or if a child's
compensation increases relative to that of her parents. As suggested in the theoretical
framework, and following the empirical evidence, we assume that most individuals
work in self-employment (Ciarli et al., 2015).
Using the same IV strategy we estimate the eﬀect of conﬂict on household expen-
diture, distinguishing between food and non-food. Table 12 in the Appendix suggests
that households experience a drop in total per capita monthly expenditure of 640
Afghani (about 23.6%) for each additional conﬂict event every 1000 inhabitants. In
other words, in higher conﬂict areas household's income is more likely to fall below
subsistence level pushing parents to send their children to work, as predicted by the
model.
Why females and not males? In part because the percentage of boys working is
double with respect to girls. We also explore the possibility that girls drive the exten-
sive margin results due to an increase in activities that take place within dwellings, i.e.
more protected with respect to activities tat take place in shops, streets, or ﬁelds, more
exposed to the direct consequences of conﬂict. We estimate equation 4 (e = [0; 6= 0])
for diﬀerent activities, distinguishing between all activities (retributed and non) that
take place in dwellings, agriculture, shops, and which are more hazardous. Tables 14
suggests that the probability of a girl working in the household's dwellings increases
of about 3 percentage points as a response to a unitary increase in the measure of
conﬂict, while the probability of a girl of working in a shop decreases of about 0.1 per-
centage points. We do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect on other economic sectors (agriculture,
hazardous type of work such as constructions and quarrying and other) and for boys.9
The increase in the probability of working only for girls seems to be partly explained
that parents may prefer to increase activities that are better protected from conﬂict.
It should be noted that these activities do not have to be households chorse, rather
9Table not reported for brevity, available upon request
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activities that increase the household compensation, such as producing handicrafts
and carpet weaving Lyby (2006).
Second, the framework also predicts that as children wage increase, they are more
likely to reduce the time for leisure/school and increase the number of hours worked.
We do not have information on wages, and as suggested most economic activities in
Afghanistan are related to self-employment (mostly in subsistence agriculture). There-
fore we estimate the eﬀect of conﬂict on the adults/children working ratio. If the rel-
ative compensation of adults decreases with respect to children, we expect less adults
to work, and the other way round if the relative compensation of children decreases.
Table 13 suggests that conﬂict increases adult's labor supply in the household as more
than proportionally with respect to children: the share of adults working increases by
28% for an increase in one conﬂict per 1000 inhabitants. As predicted by the model,
we ﬁnd that children (girls) reduce the number of non-domestic hours worked. Why
girls? Because they tend to work in less remunerative activities than boys (Table 5),
i.e. the diﬀerence with respect to parents' compensation is larger.
We also tested for the competing hypothesis that a decrease in the supply of school-
ing  for instance because of security reasons or because schools were destroyed  could
decrease the opportunity cost of sending children to work. As the opportunity for
leisure decrease, the framework employed in this paper would predict an increase in
the probability that a child works, and an increase in the number of hours worked.
The increase in girl's labor supply could be due to a lack of opportunity rather than
to necessity. Employing the same IV strategy We estimated the eﬀect of conﬂict on
school enrollment, distinguishing by gender. Table 15 suggests that there is no sig-
niﬁcant impact of conﬂict on school enrollment. If anything, the eﬀect is positive on
girls. However, this results should be taken cautiously, and not as deﬁnitive. It is well
possible that one cross section might not be suﬃcient to estimate the impact of con-
ﬂict on schooling in a country that has been in conﬂict for several years (not enough
geographical variation in school enrollment in one year).
Overall, these ﬁndings suggest that the necessity hypothesis drives the increase
23
in children labor supply when conﬂict intensity increases, but the number of hours
worked falls as the relative remuneration of the new children entering in the labor
market decreases. They are consistent with the literature suggesting that parents are
altruistic and send children to work for necessity (Basu and Van, 1998; Manacorda,
2006, e.g.). Manacorda (2006), for instance, ﬁnds that a rise in the proportion of
working children by household is associated with no variation in parent's labor supply
and that parents redistribute entirely the returns from child labor to the children in
the household.
4.3 Robustness checks
We ran a number of robustness checks (results available in Appendix C)
First, we estimated an IV Tobit model censored at zero hours worked to capture the
impact of conﬂict on the extensive and the intensive margins combined (see Equation
6).
eihd =

0 (Yihd∗ < 0)
eihd∗ (eihd∗ ≥ 0)
(5)
eihd∗ = α1 + α2Xidt + uihd, uihd ∼ N(0, σ2) (6)
where eihd∗ is a latent variable.
Table 16 in Appendix C suggests that one more conﬂict every 1000 inhabitants
decreases the average daily number of non-domestic hours worked about 0.27 hours
for girls at the 10% level of signiﬁcance. The result clearly combine the impact of
conﬂict on the extensive and the intensive margin, suggesting that the intensive margin
prevails when counting the total number of worked hours, but does not allow us to
disentangle the two eﬀects.
The second robustness check addresses the concern that omitted geographical and
ethnic factors may have inﬂuenced both the Soviet conﬂict in 1979-89 and child labor
in 2007-2008. We reran our results controlling for the distance of the household from
Pakistan, a good proxy for terrain ruggedness, altitude, and ethnicity. The results in
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Table 17 show that the results on the extensive margin are unchanged.
Third, because Kabul (with a high conﬂict intensity with respect to other urban
areas) may drive the overall results, we exclude it from the estimation. Table 18
shows that the impact of conﬂict on the extensive margin of child labor supply does
not change.
The fourth robustness check addresses the concern that the Soviet conﬂict (1979-
89) might be correlated to child labor in 2007/08 through the death of one of the
parents. We added to the regressions a variable controlling for the presence of the
father and of the mother in the household. Table 19 and 20 suggest that, despites the
fact that the presence of the mother in the household decreases the probability that
either a boy or a girl may work, conﬂict intensity has the same positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the probability for a girl to work.
Other robustness checks, not reported in the paper for brevity, were run using both
a quadratic and an hyperbolic measure of conﬂict. The results are not signiﬁcant,
suggesting that these models do not ﬁt the relationship between conﬂict and child
labor.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analyzed the eﬀect of conﬂict intensity in a district on both the
extensive margin and the intensive margin of child labor supply (6-15), in the same
district, in Afghanistan in 2007/08.
Extending Basu and Van (1998) framework to a conﬂict context, we show that
parents may send their children to work when conﬂict drives income below the sub-
sistence level, due to a reduction in the remuneration of their activity. However, the
amount of work to which children in the labor market devote their time, may increase
if conﬂict also increases the relative compensation of children with respect to adults
and when the opportunity cost of working is low, perhaps because there is no access
to school or other activities.
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Our results suggest that in conﬂict aﬀected areas girls only are more likely to join
the labor force but work fewer daily non-domestic hours per week. The magnitude
of the eﬀects is signiﬁcant: a one unit increase in conﬂict intensity (one conﬂict over
1000 individuals in the district) increases the probability that a girl works by about
7 percentage points. The decrease in the number of hours worked in non-domestic
activities per per capita conﬂict event is lower: 0.3 hours per week. We do not ﬁnd
any signiﬁcant eﬀect on domestic hours worked (household chores) and on boys.
We provide evidence that the increase in the extensive margin of child labor may
indeed be due to a fall in household's income: household total per capita expenditure
drops by 21.5% for an additional conﬂict event (per 1000 inhabitants). The increase
in the number of working girls may be due to the fact that hey work on activities that
are more shielded from conﬂict, within the household, in both paid and subsistence
activities. We also provide evidence that the decrease in the intensive margin of child
labor, instead, may be due to an increase in the relative compensation of adults with
respect to children, as suggested by the positive eﬀect of conﬂict events on the ratio
between adults and children working. Instead, we ﬁnd no evidence for the opportunity
cost argument. In our results conﬂict does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect school enrollment.
War worsens households economic conditions, pushing girls (in Afghanistan) to
work, although their work is less intensive. Girls end up working more in both paid
and subsistence activities that take place in the household dwellings (carpet weaving,
farming). This eﬀect should be considered when regulating child labor, increasing the
regulation of indoor working activities in conﬂict-ridden states.
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A Data Description
A.1 Variable description
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Table 10: Variables description
Variables Description
Dependent variables
Working child (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child works, 0 otherwise
N. of domestic hours worked Average n. of domestic hours worked by the child per day in the past 7 days
by the child on household chores, or tending children,
cooking, fetching water or other household chores
N. of domestic hours worked Average n. of hours worked by the child per day in the past 7 days
Works in the HH dwellings (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child works in the house
Works in agric. (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child works in agriculture
Works in an hazardous activity (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child works in a hazardous activity
Works in a shop (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child works in a shop
Works in another activity (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child works in other activities
School enrolment (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child is enrolled in school, 0 otherwise
Non-food expenditure (per capita) Non-food expenditure (per capita) in the previous 30 days in Afghani
Food expenditure (per capita) Food expenditure (per capita) in the previous 30 days in Afghani
Total expenditure (per capita) Total HH expenditure (per capita) in the previous 30 days in Afghani
Regular employee paid to parents in kind (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child is a regular employee paid to parents in kind, 0 otherwise
Regular employee paid to parents in money (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child is a regular employee paid to parents in money, 0 otherwise
Regular employee paid to the child in kind (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child is a regular employee paid to the child in kind, 0 otherwise
Regular employee paid to the child in money (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child is a regular employee paid to the child in money, 0 otherwise
Casual employee paid to parents (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child is a casual employee paid to parents, 0 otherwise
Casual employee paid to child (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child is a casual employee paid to child, 0 otherwise
Has his business (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child has is business, 0 otherwise
Unpaid family worker in the HH (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child is an unpaid family worker, 0 otherwise
Works in agric./livestock (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child works in agriculture/livestock, 0 otherwise
Works in another activity (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child works in another activity, 0 otherwise
Household variables
Household size Household size
Male head (dummy) Equal to 1 if the household head is a male, 0 otherwise
Age of the household head Age of the HH head
Average age in the household Average age of the HH members
% of male children in the household % of male children in the household
% of male adults in the household % of male children in the household
Literacy of the household head (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the HH head is literate, 0 otherwise
Rural (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the HH lives in a rural community, 0 otherwise
N. of household assets Number of assets in the HH
Migration of a household member (Dummy) Equal to 1 if any HH member migrated in the past year, 0 otherwise
Shocks (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the HH experienced a shock in the previous year, 0 otherwise
Total HH expenditure (per capita) Total household expenditure in the past 30 days (measured in Afghani)
Food expenditure (per capita) Food household expenditure in the past 30 days (measured in Afghani)
Non-food expenditure (per capita) Non-food household expenditure in the past 30 days (measured in Afghani)
Distance to Pakistan Distance from the household to Pakistan in Km.
School enrolment missing (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the school enrolment dummy is missing, 0 otherwise
Individual variables
Age Age of the individual
Sex (Dummy) Sex of the individual
Conﬂict variables (deﬁned more in detail in the Appendix)
N. of conﬂicts Number of conﬂict events in the district (normalized by population per district)
Instrumental variable
IV N. of conﬂict events in the district from 1979 to 1989 (GDELT data)
District variables
% of rural communities Share of rural communities in the district
% of households with opium cultivation as a main income Average number of households whose ﬁrst source of income is opium cultivation
Avg. age Average age in the district
% of males Share of males in the district
% of literate adults Share of literate adults in the district
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A.2 Conﬂict data
Activities deﬁnition
AIR ASSAULT conﬂict air operations
AMBUSH ambushes that most of the times end up with
wounded/killed and with explosions
AMF-ON-ANA events where a ﬁre, even if friendly, occurred
ANA-ON-ANP events where a ﬁre, even if friendly, occurred
ARSON actions where buildings/infrastructures were set on ﬁre
ASSASSINATION events where people were killed
ATTACK events where someone was attacked. Not necessarily in-
volves wounded/killed
BLUE-GREEN events where there is a ﬁre
BLUE-BLUE events where there is a ﬁre
BLUE/WHITE events where there is a ﬁre
BREACHING events with ﬁre and possibly casualties
CARJACKING mainly enemies hijacking cars or other private vehicles
CCA diverse suspicious events
CAS events where helicopters are involved in the attack
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT events where helicopters are involved in the attack
COUNTER INSURGENCY violent actions
COUNTER MORTAR FIRE events where there is a ﬁre
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY it can include explosions, theft, wounded journalists during
attacks
DELIBERATE ATTACK it includes diverse violent actions, sometimes with
wounded/killed individuals
DIRECT FIRE events where there is a ﬁre
DOWNED AIRCRAFT it describes operations where aircrafts were downed
DRUG OPERATION it can include ﬁres and violent actions
ENEMY ACTION it describes violent events with ﬁre
ESCALATION OF FORCE It describes violent actions with possibly wounded/killed
GREEN-BLUE it describes events where there is a ﬁre
GREEN-GREEN it describes events where there is a ﬁre
GREEN-WHITE it describes events where there is a ﬁre
DF COUNTER FIRE it describes events where there is a ﬁre
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KIDNAPPING it describes operations where someone was kidnapped
LOOTING it describes operations where a loot took place
MINE STRIKE events where there is an explosion
MURDER it describes operations where someone was murdered
IED AMBUSH attack on US army using Improvised Explosion Device
IDF INTERDICTION prediction of a future ﬁre/bombing while not happened yet
IED FOUND/CLEARED IED detonated by the US military
IED EXPLOSION mainly bombs, or suicide bombs against military and civil-
ians
INTERDICTION suicide bombers are spot and blocked, arrested, or killed,
sometimes the IED explodes
SNIPER OPERATIONS ﬁre starts from an hidden place
TRIBAL ﬁre events. Violent tribal disputes
TRIBAL FEUD violent tribal disputes
UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle): Mixed events that can include
ﬁre, wounded/killed
POLICE ACTIONS they can be either violent or not. They can include ﬁre
MEDEVAC(LOCAL NATIONAL medical interventions
MINE FOUND/CLEARED non-violent event
MOVEMENT TO CONTACT movement in order to contact the enemy. It can be violent
but not always
MUGGING it describes operations where someone was mugged
NARCOTICS disruption of a major drug labs
NBC event that describes a show of force
NONE SELECTED diverse events some of them violent
OTHER conﬂict related event, with ﬁre, or explosion
OTHER (HOSTILE ACTION) events such as kidnapping/killing/robbery
OTHER DEFENSIVE it can include ﬁre/violent events
OTHER OFFENSIVE it can include ﬁre/violent events
POLICE ACTIONS they can be either violent or not. They can include ﬁre
POLICE INTERNAL violent events with ﬁre, wounded/killed
PLANNED EVENT mixed evidence but mostly violent events
PREMATURE DETONATION explosive events
RAID violent events with possibly wounded/killed individuals
RPG rocket-propelled grenade actions
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SAFIRE surface to air ﬁre
SEARCH AND ATTACK violent actions with possibly wounded/killed individuals
SECTARIAN VIOLENCE violent events such as suicide bombers
SHOW OF FORCE it reports either battle events or events where there is a ﬁre
SMALL UNIT ACTIONS violent actions possibly with direct ﬁre, possibly with
wounded/killed individuals
SNIPER OPS ﬁre started from an hidden place
UNKNOWN EXPLOSION explosive event
VANDALISM diverse disruptive events
VOGE visual observation of ground explosion
Table 11: List of categories included among the relevant conﬂict events
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B A Graphic Explanation
In this section we study the eﬀect of a reduction in wa graphically for the simplest
possible household, with one child M = 1, who consumes half of what is consumed by
the parents (b = 1/2), and for which subsistence is equal to one (s = 1).
Figure 1 shows the diﬀerent areas of no work (blue area above the e = 0 segment),
maximum work (red area below the e = 1 segment) and the area in which the eﬀort
may change between 0 and 1 (light grey area between the e = 0 and the e = 1
segments). The graph shows that, for our one child example household, when we
consider children's compensation, a child might be sent to work even if the household
consumption is above subsistence level. In particular, children that are similar to
adults (grown up and skilled enough to have the same compensation) always work
to some extent (wa = wc segment). As a child's compensation reduces, they are
less likely to be sent to work, c÷teris paribus. For instance, a child that earns half
of her parents (grey line wa = 2Wc) will go to work if the parents' compensation is
below twice the budget constraint. Similarly, when parents' compensation is below the
budget constraint, the probability that the child consumes no leisure increases with
her compensation.
0
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3
4
0 1 2 3
Wc
W
a
Legend e=0 e=1 Wa = 2Wc Wa = Wc
Children effort areas
Figure 1: Areas of children total and zero eﬀort.
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Changing the parameters deﬁning the household does not aﬀect the main story.
An increase in the subsistence level of consumption (s), or in a child's equivalent
consumption (b), simply shifts both curves e = 0 and e = 1 upwards, which as we
know implies that a child will be sent to work for a relatively higher wa. An increase
in the number of children (M) shift both curves upwards and increases their slope.
This aﬀects the role of wa: a a household with two children will always send them to
work if their salary is half of their parents'.
Next, to assess the amount of eﬀort that children devote to labour (em ∈ [0, 1]) or,
the amount of time that they subtract from leisure and education (1 − s), we study
graphically the third condition (between the blue e = 0 segment and the red e = 1
segment) for diﬀerent levels of wa and wc, and for the same one child household deﬁned
above. Figure 2 uses a density plot to represent the level of e for diﬀerent combinations
of wa and wc, for values of em ∈ [0, 1].
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wa = wc
Figure 2: Child intensive margin for diﬀerent combinations of wa and wc.
Focussing again on the child whose compensation is half of that of the parents, as
wa falls below twice the subsistence level, she starts to exert a small eﬀort. The eﬀort
increases if wa reduces even more. However, if wc falls more than proportionally than
wa, the child will reduce her eﬀort and work less hours.
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To summarise, an increase in conﬂict reduces wa and wc. If conﬂict does not change
the redistribution between wa and wc, an increase in conﬂict implies an increase in the
number of children working in the household to compensate for the loss in consumption.
That is, conﬂict has a positive eﬀect on the children employment extensive margin.
With reference to Figure 1 a grown up child, with a productivity similar to an
adult, works even in the absence of conﬂict. Young children, instead, are sent to
work only if conﬂict reduces compensations by a signiﬁcant amount. The larger the
diﬀerence between wa and wc the fewer children work.
With reference to Figure 2 on the intensive margin, if wc reduces more than pro-
portionally with respect to wa children work less, as the opportunity cost of reducing
leisure is not compensated by the increase in household income. Whether conﬂict in
Afghanistan has a larger eﬀect on wa or on wc can be empirically tested looking at the
change in the share of adults over children working in a household due to conﬂict.
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C Further Results and Robustness Checks Tables
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Table 13: IV estimates of conﬂict on the ratio between adult working and
children working
(1)
(IV)
VARIABLES Adults/children in work in the HH
N. conﬂicts 0.280***
(0.078)
HH controls Yes
District level controls Yes
Observations 12,514
R2 0.220
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are variables deﬁned at the child level.
Conﬂict measures instead are deﬁned at the district level. All the
conﬂict measures are normalised by population (a unit of conﬂict
is 1/1000 inhabitants). Estimated with the variables described in
Table 10. First stage results available on request
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C.1 Robustness checks
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D Extra Figures
50
(a) Average n. of non-domestic daily hours worked in the week prior to
the survey
(b) Average n. of domestic daily hours worked in the week prior to the
survey
Figure 3: Distribution of non-domestic and domestic hours worked both in
low and high conﬂict areas
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